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EA RM A RK ED  SAFE TY M O N E Y  EFFECTIVE IN G E O R G IA
There is much discussion, particularly in federal circles, whether it 
is proper to earmark money for safety projects or to provide lump 
sums with broad discretional capabilities for administrators to meet 
needs differently within a given state. The question remains, will this 
latter method best respond to the highway safety problems of America 
or is earmarking money for safety a myth? Webster tells us the defini­
tion of a myth involves the creation of a story that reveals an un­
scientific account, belief, or theory. I wonder today, as we look at 
the record, if we can ascertain whether earmarking money for safety 
purposes has been a myth or, in actuality, has been a boon to America’s 
improvement in highway safety.
Let’s look at the facts. It is generally conceded that our country 
marked its peak in traffic fatalities in 1973 when 56,000 people were 
killed on the nation’s highways. In our own state of Georgia, this was 
the peak year as 1,926 deaths (an all-time high) were recorded. I 
wonder if it is a coincidence that 1973 was also the year the Highway 
Safety Act stipulated that funds should be spent in several specific 
areas which we came to know as Title II. And I wonder if it is also 
a coincidence that the 1966 Safety Act which stipulated performance 
standards for 18 different areas, for the most part finally came under 
sanctions in 1973 when the states were advised that they would produce 
or be sanctioned. Other programs, such as TO PIC S, also had earmarked 
money involved in a mad scramble for implementation in 1973 to 
avoid the lapse of funds. All of these actions resulted in a significant 
change in the highway environments arrival of 1974.
Coincidentally, in 1974 there was a national downtrend in acci­
dent experience. Many people are quick to point out that this down­
trend occurred due to the energy crisis and mandatory reduction to 
a 55 mph speed limit. Also, other factors included a reduction in 
travel as vehicle miles were recorded down in most every state, a 
trend to smaller vehicles was beginning, the oil crisis, improved safety 
equipment for autos, and the nation’s economy in general was tightened.
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All of these were reasons logically advanced for the decline in traffic 
fatalities.
While the verdict is not finally in, it can certainly be appreciated 
that many states including Georgia did register significant decreases in 
their fatality experience during 1975. Speaking of our situation in 
Georgia, we recorded a reduction of about 20 percent fatalities in 
1974 over 1973. (See Figure 1.) The numbers were reduced from 
1,912 in 1973 to 1,557 in 1974. This reduction trend even continued 
into 1975 when our current total of 1,383 fatalities indicated an 
additional 11 percent reduction over that experienced in 1974. Thus, 
one can see through all these statistics that if Georgia’s all-time high 
of 1,912 fatalities had continued through 1974 and 1975, over 900 
additional lives would have been lost. In actuality, 529 fewer people 
were killed during this period than the respective year before. This 
is a total reduction slightly less than 30 percent.
Figure 1.
Did earmarking the money for highway safety improvements play 
a role in this reduction, or is this a myth? Consider that the 1975 
reduction, at least in Georgia, continued at a significant rate. Yet 
most of the generally acknowledged traffic factors had been accounted 
for during 1974. Most knowledgeable experts think the effects of 
the 55 mph speed limit leveled off by mid-1974 and later, speeds were 
actually measured on a slight increase toward the end of 1974. Cer­
tainly traffic volumes have recovered. Georgia’s experience indicates
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that 1975 volumes exceeded our previous all-time 1973 high. What 
then could have had an effect in 1975? Could it possibly be that the 
earmarking of money for safety projects, which was initiated in 1973, 
had picked up a head of steam and was now beginning to pay direct 
dividends to those who were advantaged in following the program 
specifically? I think the answer is yes, and I would like to demonstrate 
to you from the experiences in Georgia some of the reasons that 
make me draw these conclusions. I will reveal to you briefly some 
project locations where improvements were made that are typical of 
reducing and eliminating accident hazard and frequency.
IN T E R S T A T E  SAFETY
Many modifications are needed for improved interstate safety, 
including attenuation devices, grooving of pavement, breakaway poles, 
improvement of median barrier systems, adding street illumination for 
nighttime problems, improved treatment for lane drop and for lane 
carry conditions, such as when two facilities merge into one. Our 
accident statistics have enjoyed a substantial reduction in recent years 
on the interstate system, a goodly portion which can be attributed 
to projects of this type. During 1971, our final interstate fatal accident 
rate was 3.16 per 100 M V M  and this figure had been reduced to 
1.39 fatalities per 100 M V M  of travel in 1974, and we expect it 
to be even better in 1975. Our volumes were up, but we lost only 
85 persons in an interstate traffic fatality compared to 106 in 1974. 
I would like to highlight for you just three representative projects: •
• A  ramp metering project in downtown Atlanta on the con­
nector carrying both I-75 and I-85.
• A  bridge barrier rail project on I-20 just outside of Atlanta.
• A safety modification project on I-85 in north Georgia.
In Atlanta on the I-75 downtown connector, southbond at North 
Avenue, a ramp metering project was installed at a location which 
sets up a short weaving type conflict. (See Figure 2.) While ac­
complished only at a cost of $2,200, it produced a first-year benefit 
of $153,000 since the accidents were reduced over 50 percent, from 
203 to 101 annually. Further north on this highway, a similar type 
problem was treated by channeling an on-ramp from Peachtree Road 
directly into I-75, thus eliminating another potential weaving con­





Sometimes, accident locations are at a spot. Consider a bridge 
on I-20 outside Atlanta. Seven fatalities were recorded on this bridge 
in a period of six years. Each of the fatal accidents had the same 
characteristic of the vehicle losing control and veering into the side
117
of the bridge. Efforts to correct the problem included the use of 
raised pavement markers, striping, and, significantly, the construction 
of the New Jersey barrier wall for a handrail in conjunction with 
some widening of the bridge. Skid marks on the barrier are indicative 
of at least one fatality being averted since this recent construction.
Interstate safety modifications have been frequently utilized as 
safety projects in Georgia. This one covering 54 miles on I-85 in 
north Georgia, through five counties, saw a reduction of average 
annual fatalities from 16 to three after completion of the project. 
Mainly, motorists have been running into fixed objects, going between 
twin bridges, and are not properly redirected through guardrail at­
tachments.
TO PIC S A N D  SAFETY
Our TO PIC S and safety work have addressed the largest number 
of individual locations where problems of hazard or congestion exist. 
During fiscal year 1975, over 600 locations were treated with im­
provements by signalization, intersection channelization, reversible 
lanes, turn lanes, street lighting, signal systems, pavement markings 
including plastic and raised pavement markers, skid resistance, and 
improved signing and signal displays. This is the program directed 
to urban areas where problems in Georgia are at a maximum. While 
the state has enjoyed a substantial decrease in fatalities in the last 
several years, this reduction has not been so apparent in the urban 
areas. Before 1975, the TO PIC S programs were directed mostly to 
those urban areas over 50,000. Since its initiation, three of those seven 
areas have already begun to show a definite decline in their accident 
and fatality pictures. These are Columbus, Atlanta, and Albany, 
Georgia. However, traffic accident hazards in the remaining four 
metropolitan areas and the hundreds of smaller urban sections of 
the state have continued to amass alarming numbers in the traffic 
accident picture. This is indicative that more of this type of work, 
on a cost-effective basis, will be the key to reversing this trend through­
out the state. For example, let’s examine some of these projects.
Figure 4 shows a project in Atlanta on Memorial Drive (S.R. 
154). A  reversible lane was created with the provision of overhead 
signal modernization and minor widening. The project was accom­
plished for $97,000, and due to the reduction in travel times, ac­
cumulated a first-year benefit of approximately $140,000. Further, 
an accident reduction of 25 percent was experienced when the one 
year before and after count was reduced from 220 to 165.
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Figure 4.
In Chatham County, nine locations were grouped in a project, cost­
ing $264,000. This widening, resurfacing, channelization, and signal 
modernization produced a first-year benefit, nearly paying for the cost 
of the project at $205,000. The accidents were reduced over 50 
percent with a one-year before and after reduction from 273 to 136.
In Columbus, we have apparently been able to record a significant 
improvement in accident experience due to coordination of traffic 
signals on Macon Road. This signal system was accomplished for 
$115,000 and has registered reductions in accident experience, es­
pecially at critical midblock locations. The average overall accident 
reduction of 15 percent was not as impressive as the record of high 
accident experience at crucial midblocks. For example, at Midtown 
Drive, an unsignalized intersection, monthly accidents dropped from 
11 to 3 (73 percent). This has greatly improved efficiency of use for 
this 25,000 vehicle-per-day traffic corridor, vital to the city commerce.
M A IN T E N A N C E  B E T T E R M E N T S
This work has included adjustments for signing, channelization, 
pavement markings, flood control, passing lanes, turn lanes, shoulder 
improvements, and emergency signal work including special traffic con­
trol of overspeed, underspeed, and overheight detection systems. For 
the most part, these are our rural projects comparable to the efforts 
accomplished in TO PIC S and safety work noted above. Since most
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of the principal traffic arteries in this rural environment are on the 
state system, many of the most serious problems have been given 
attention, and that is reflected in substantial reductions in hazard for 
those areas. Georgia’s peak fatality experience was recorded in 1973 
when 1,912 people were killed in auto accidents. This compares with 
1,508 recorded in 1971 and 1,557 recorded in 1974. O f significance, 
however: in 1971, 1,255 of the 1,509 occurred in rural areas, whereas 
in 1974, only 1,064 of the 1,557 occurred in rural areas. Consider 
some examples of this work.
Here are three representative projects. The first is in Baldwin 
County involving the channelization of an intersection at S.R. 24 
and S.R. 22. In the year before this work was accomplished, ten 
accidents, eight injuries, and no fatalities were recorded. In the one 
year since the work, not a single accident has been recorded. The 
project cost only $1,000. In Walker County, 33 accidents, 14 injuries, 
and three fatalities had occurred in a ten-mile sector due largely to 
the loss of control from bad shoulders. The shoulders were paved 
at a cost of $22,000, and in the one year following the completion 
of the work, nine accidents, five injuries, and two fatalities were the 
result.
Our passing lane program is typified by a project in Stephens 
County on S.R. 12. (See Figure 5.) Here a climbing lane was 
constructed for a mile and a half in length at a cost of $41,000. The
Figure 5.
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accident experience registered a decrease from 14 in the year before 
the lane to two after the lane. However, of equal importance was that 
six injuries and one fatality before the advent of the climbing lane 
was reduced to no fatalities and no injuries afterwards.
O T H E R  SAFETY IM P R O V E M E N T S
This work includes improvements that have been accomplished on 
our interstate travelways, as well as the programs addressed under 
the Title II portion of the Highway Safety Act. That is, programs 
that address railroad crossings for active or passive improvements, 
pavement marking demonstrations, roadside obstacles, high hazard 
improvements, and safer roads demonstrations. Most of this work 
in dollar volume is accounted for under the Title II programs. Repre­
sentative of the type wx>rk accomplished are projects like our recent 
treatment of the U.S. 41 interstate travelway connecting the uncom­
pleted links of I-75 north of Atlanta. This project registered a de­
crease from 34 fatalities in 1972 with 1,271 accident occurrences to 
a 1975 year-to-date experience of five fatalities and 449 accident 
occurrences. The type improvements registered included median guard­
rail, turn lanes, pavement markers, special treatment of additional 
superelevation on a particular hazardous curve, the addition of traffic 
signals at key locations, and the use of special effects signing for this 
corridor. (See Figure 6.) The U.S. 41 interstate travelway connecting
Figure 6.
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the uncompleted sections of I-75 was 31 miles long in 1972. You 
can see that its wide median and exceptional condition could lull some 
travelers into thinking they were still on the interstate. In fact it 
did. Tragically, 34 fatalities were recorded on those 31 miles. In 
an attempt to get public attention and change this operating en­
vironment, the actions described above caused major reductions in 
the user characteristics of this road. In 1975, under the same traffic 
volumes, five fatalities were recorded.
The railroad crossing problem in Georgia is of significant im­
portance. In 1974, an all-time high of 66 fatalities were recorded in 
highway/railroad grade crossings. It was not coincidence that only 17 
crossings were identified as safety hazards and provided bells, lights, 
and gates for active protection during that year. In fiscal 1975, how­
ever, the picture began to change drastically, and, since then, 214 active 
crossings already have been protected in a manner similar to that shown 
here. (See Figure 7.) The results are indicative of this type of work 
activity. W e recorded 24 fatalities in car/train collisions as compared 
to 171 that were recorded 1972-1974. Those crossings that cannot 
be provided immediate attention with lights, bells, and gates are 
provided other controls. For example, this crossing near Milledgeville, 
Georgia, was provided street illumination since the only train activity 
was at night and since several fatalities had been recorded. Ironically, 
but also tragically, before these lights could be erected, two individuals
Figure 7.
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on two successive Saturday nights ran into the side of the same sched­
uled train, with fatal injuries resulting in both cases. Most of the 
other critical crossings (1,500 during 1975) have been treated with 
passive controls such as signs and pavement markings.
D R IV E W A Y  C O N TR O LS
The effective control of driveways has proven a significant benefit 
in Georgia. (See Figure 8.) While there is much work yet to be 
done, there are indications that accident experience can be reduced 
more than one-half in those areas that have defined points of ingress 
and egress through driveway control. For instance, an example in 
Clayton County with curb control compared to Upson County without 
curb control, under the same 8,000 vehicles per day, produced annual 
accident experience of nine in the first case and 20 in the second. 
Sampling the work that has been accomplished in the state and com­
puting the rate of accidents per 100 M V M , we find that the acci­
dents tend to be below the average throughout the state for sections 
that have controlled drives and more than twice the state average 
for those sections not having driveway controls. (See Figures 9 and
10.) Thus, to not use driveway controls as an effective tool for 
improvement is to negate an important asset available for the regu­
lation of partial access control.
STATEWIDE SAM PLE  
COMPARISON OF ACCIDENT RATES  




CO N CLU SIO N S
I cannot categorically state that earmarking money for safety is 
the only means whereby traffic safety improvements will come about. 
I can state that there does appear to be a direct relation between
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the timing when some safety funds were earmarked and the change 
in tide to register improvements in highway safety. Certainly, ear­
marking federal funds will lend a tremendous boost to highway safety. 
The ability for a direct payoff in the improvement of highway safety 
can be seen through unbiased eyes that examine past results. I would 
humbly submit the proper prescription to anecdote our current traffic 
ills is for more of the same— traffic engineering programs directed to 
the heart of the cancer. Earmarking funds to representative areas of 
the traffic safety problem can do no harm and can potentially accelerate 
the ability of this country to correct one of its largest social ills— the 
traffic safety hazard.
As we look ahead to a changing economy, political pressure, and 
public demand, certainly we can see insurance to our highway safety 
effort will be increased by earmarking funds in a manner experienced 
with TO PIC S, Title II, and Highway Safety Program areas. This 
approach will shield us from the human factors environment that push 
in the direction of least resistance. Each day now, we see increasing 
demands for reduced administrative cost (PE and design costs are 
nearly as high for a TO PIC S project as a multimillion dollar road), 
less new funds available for the future facility (building that long- 
range commitment for a four-lane road), and other complications on 
the social, ecological, political, and economical battlefield. All of these 
are valid pressures which cause it to be in our best interest as traffic 
safety engineers to dispel negative thoughts regarding the earmarked 
money myth.
